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solution addressing many problems facing statistical spam filters, the most widely 
adopted technology for detecting junk emails. In particular, some SCSD systems can 
identify previously unseen spam messages as such, although intuitively this would 
appear to be impossible. However, the SCSD approach usually relies on huge 
databases of email signatures, demanding lots of resource in signature lookup as well 
as signature database storage, transmission and merging. In this paper, we report our 
enhancements to two representative SCSD systems. In our enhancements, signature 
lookups can be performed in O (1), independent of the number of signatures in the 
database. Space-efficient representation can significantly reduce signature database 
size, before any data compression algorithm is applied. A simple but fast algorithm 
for merging different signature databases is also supported. We use the Bloom filter 
and a novel variant to achieve all this. 
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Abstract—Signature-based collaborative spam detection
(SCSD) systems provide a promising solution addressing many
problems facing statistical spam filters, the most widely adopted
technology for detecting junk emails. In particular, some SCSD
systems can identify previously unseen spam messages as
such, although intuitively this would appear to be impossible.
However, the SCSD approach usually relies on huge databases
of email signatures, demanding lots of resource in signature
lookup as well as signature database storage, transmission and
merging. In this paper, we report our enhancements to two
representative SCSD systems. In our enhancements, signature
lookups can be performed in O(1), independent of the number
of signatures in the database. Space-efficient representation can
significantly reduce signature database size, before any data
compression algorithm is applied. A simple but fast algorithm
for merging different signature databases is also supported. We
use the Bloom filter and a novel variant to achieve all this.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spam (junk bulk email) is an ever-increasing problem. It
causes annoyance to individual email users but also imposes
significant costs on many organisations. The automatic recog-
nition of spam messages so that they can be discarded rather
than passed on to the intended albeit unwilling recipient is a
difficult task, without very satisfactory solutions at the present
time.
To date, statistical spam filters are probably the most heavily
studied, and the most widely adopted technology for detect-
ing junk emails. However, among other disadvantages, these
filters need to be regularly “trained” (i.e. presented with large
numbers of messages that have each previously been classified
as to whether they should be classed as spam), particularly
when the filters result in excessive numbers of “false positive”
or “false negative” decisions. In particular such systems fail
to detect spam that cannot be predicted by the machine
learning algorithms on which they are based. Such filters also
cannot identify spam that is sent as an image attachment to
an otherwise unobjectionable email message. In addition, as
content-based filters, they are dependent on languages (e.g.
a filter trained for English is useless in detecting spam in
Chinese, and vice versa) and vulnerable to various content-
manipulation attacks (e.g. the so-called “filter poisoning”).
An alternative approach is Signature-based Collaborative
Spam Detection (SCSD), an approach which is based on
simple but powerful insights as will be described below. This
approach provides a promising solution addressing all the
problems facing statistical filters. In particular, some SCSD
detectors can identify previously unseen spam messages as
such, although intuitively this would appear to be impossible.
Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse (DCC) [3] is one of
the two pioneering SCSD systems. Its design is based on
a simple but insightful observation: spam by definition is
unsolicited bulk email, so we can detect spam by checking
for “bulkiness”. That is, when a message that has been seen
many times elsewhere on the Internet reaches you, if it is not
from any person, organisation or email list that appears on
your so-called “white list”, then it is safe for the email system
to treat it as spam and discard it. This is a clever way of
detecting and dealing with spam email messages (including
those unforeseeable new ones) without checking the message
content.
Another pioneering SCSD system is Razor [7], which is
based on the idea: if a message has been identified elsewhere
as spam by somebody trustworthy, then this human effort
should and can be shared/reused.
As indicated, both DCC and Razor are signature-based. In
the simplest conceptual form of both systems, one signature
(i.e., digest or checksum) is computed with a cryptographic
hash function h() to represent each message. Since any slight
change in input to such a hash function will dramatically
change its output, msg1 and msg2 are considered the same
if and only if h(msg1) = h(msg2). Apparently, the use of
crypto hash functions also addresses users’ privacy concern
well. In the actual implementations of the two systems, multi-
ple different signatures are calculated for the same message in
some scenarios. To simplify our discussion, unless otherwise
indicated, we assume in this paper that an email message is
represented by a single signature. However, our discussions
can be generalised to the actual case easily.
In a DCC system, a server collects and accumulates counts
of signatures for email messages. To decide whether a new
message is spam, a DCC client queries the server using a
signature of the message. If the count number for the signature
returned by the server is larger than a local threshold value set
by the user, then the message is marked as spam.
In Razor, a server maintains a database of signatures for
identified spam. That is, an end-user identifies a spam message
and then reports its signature to the server serving him. Other
users will query the server to detect spam in their mail boxes: if
a particular email message already has its signature appearing
in the server database, then it is spam.
Both DCC and Razor are collaborative in nature. Both
systems run a distributed network of (signature) servers, each
serving a particular part of the user population and collecting
signatures from that particular community. Signature databases
are periodically synchronised among all servers. In this way,
each user’s effort can be reused by many others.
SCSD systems provide an attractive complement to the
statistical spam filters. However, they usually rely on huge
databases of email signatures, demanding expensive computers
and lots of resource in signature lookup, storage, transmission
and merging. For example, a busy Razor or DCC server must
use a dedicated computer. A dedicated Razor server typically
handles up to 200 million queries per day. The number of
active signatures it maintains is about 10 million at any time,
and the database size exceeds 320MB [8]. A dedicated DCC
server typically handles up to 10 million requests per day. Its
database is typically of about 1 GB (up to 5 GB), storing more
than 21 million signatures [11].
We have performed an analysis of DCC source code and
confirmed that a standard technique is used by its signature
insertion, lookup and deletion operations: a hash table with
internal chaining (dealing with collisions). The collection of
message signatures, their occurrence counts and the hash table
are all stored. All this, combined, leads to a huge database
as well as expensive computation. Techniques used in Razor
are not publicly known. There is no sufficient information
publicly available to this end, and unlike the open-sourced
DCC system, the source code of Razor’s server program is
not publicly available, either. However, the size of its signature
database suggests that at least signature storage, transmission
and merging could be optimised in Razor.
In this paper, we discuss enhancements that can be done to
both Razor and DCC. In our enhancements, signature lookups
can be performed in O(1), i.e. constant time, independent
of the number of signatures in the database. Space-efficient
representation can significantly reduce signature database size
(e.g. by a factor of 16 or more for the Razor system), even
before any data compression algorithm is applied. This also
implies less traffic when signature databases are synchronized.
A simple but efficient algorithm for merging different signature
databases is also supported. We have achieved all this using
the Bloom filter technique [1] and a novel variant. Our variant
extends the standard Bloom filter scheme to support counting,
heuristics for reducing counting errors, and an innovation
for saving storage. This variant can also be applied to other
distributed applications.
The following issues are critical to the success of SCSD
systems, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
• Near-replica identification. Near-replicas are similar
messages with minor differences. Spammers often use
them to evade detection. Since any slight change in an
input to a crypto hash function will dramatically change
its output, it seems impossible to correlate near-replica
messages by examining their signatures computed with
such a hash. It would be very useful to create a “fuzzy”
hash function that will produce similar hashed values for
similar inputs. This hash should also be robust against
a number of attacks such as random addition, dictionary
substitution and perceptive substitution (e.g. substituting
“Viagra” by “V1agr@”).
• Trust. Spammers can cheat so as to defeat any spam de-
tection system. How would you differentiate trustworthy
users and spammers in the same community so that their
updates to the servers are treated differently? A proper
reputation system is essential, in particular for Razor and
the like systems.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the Bloom filter technique. Section 3 discusses
the enhancements that can be achieved in the Razor system
using Bloom filters. Section 4 introduce our new Bloom filter
variant, and discusses enhancements it can introduce to the
DCC system. Section 5 reports a simulation study, which
shows the performance improvement our new variant can
achieve in reducing counting errors. Section 6 concludes with
a summary of main contributions of this paper and a brief
discussion of our ongoing and future work.
II. BLOOM FILTERS
Conceived by Burton H Bloom in 1970, a Bloom filter is
a space-efficient data structure supporting fast membership
testing [1]. It is a bit vector B of m bits, each set to zero
initially. To insert an element x into B, you first apply k inde-
pendent, random hash functions to compute h1(x), ..., hk(x),
and then set B[h1(x)] = ... = B[hk(x)] = 1. To query if
y is a member in the filter, h1(y), ..., hk(y) are computed. If
B[h1(y)] = ... = B[hk(y)] = 1, then answer Yes, else answer
No.
A Bloom filter does not introduce false negatives (answering
no when an element is actually in the filter), but it can
cause small false positives (answering yes when querying
an element that is not in the filter). A false positive occurs
when an element y is not stored in the filter, but accidentally
(by coincidence) B[h1(y)], ..., B[hk(y)] are all set to 1. The
probability that a false positive occurs, or the false positive
rate, for a Bloom filter can be made as small as desired, and
it can be calculated as follows.
The probability that one hash fails to set a given bit is
1− 1/m. After n elements are inserted into the Bloom filter,
the probability that a specific bit is still 0 is: (1 − 1/m)kn.
The probability of a false positive, f , is the probability that a
specific set of k bits are 1, and it can be estimated with the
following approximation:
f ≈ (1− (1− 1/m)kn)k ≈ (1− e−kn/m)k (1)
Three performance metrics in a Bloom filter can be traded
off: k (computation time), m (storage size) and f (false
positive). When k = ln2×m/n, f is minimised and fmin =
( 12 )
k ≈ (0.6185)m/n, but this is not particularly relevant to
this paper, and will not be further discussed here.
It is worthwhile to note that the claim by Bloom in his
original analysis [1] that the false-positive rate f = (1− (1−
1/m)kn)k is incorrect. He implicitly assumed that the event
“B[h1(y)] = 1”, the event “B[h2(y)] = 1”, ..., and the event
“B[hk(y)] = 1” are independent. However, this assumption is
not necessarily true. For example, that B[h1(y)] is set to 1
can have an impact on the outcome of B[hk(y)]. Nonetheless,
the false positive rate of Bloom filters observed in simulations
matched well with its theoretical estimation given by Equation
(1), as shown in empirical studies such as [9].
Notable applications of Bloom filters in computer security
include the following. In early 1990’s, Spafford [12] proposed
to use a Bloom filter to build a proactive password checker
that could quickly tell whether a password candidate was in
a collection of weak passwords. Recently, a new Bloom filter
variant was introduced to store portions of network packets for
the purposes of payload attribution in forensics [10]. A brief
survey of application of the Bloom filters in other contexts is
also included in [10].
III. ENHANCING THE RAZOR SYSTEM WITH BLOOM
FILTERS
Intuitively, if signature databases are organised with Bloom
filters in the Razor system, we can achieve fast signature
lookups, significantly reduce the database size, and obtain an
efficient algorithm for merging signature databases. However,
the following two problems have to be addressed before
applying the Bloom filter technique to Razor.
• Choosing proper hash functions. A popular way of con-
structing Bloom filters is to use MD5 or other crypto-
graphic hash functions, as described in [4]. However, such
a construction and the like do not work well in our setting,
as will be discussed below.
• Signature revocation. Occasionally, a Razor server has
to revoke from its database signatures that are falsely
identified as spam. However, a Bloom filter does not
support deletion: to set a bit to zero could delete too
many elements!
Choosing proper hash functions. Fan et al [4] used MD5,
a message digest function that hashes arbitrary length strings
to 128 bits, to implement their Bloom filter. They chose k = 4,
and the k hash functions were constructed as follows: for each
x to be inserted into the filter, they first applied the MD5 to
get a 128-bit hashed value of x. The hashed value was then
divided into four 32-bit words. Taking the modulus of each
32-bit word by m, the size of the bit vector, gave an index in
the vector.
It would appear to be straightforward to generalise the above
method to construct the Bloom filters with arbitrary k hash
functions as follows.
hi(x) = (the i-th chunk of MD5(x)) mod m,
where i = 1, ..., k and k|128 (i.e., 128 is dividable by k).
However, the actual number of bits that can be utilised in the
Bloom filter will be bounded bymin(m, 2128/k). See Fig.1(a),
which shows a scenario where all bits in the filter are reachable
and thus can be utilised, and Fig.1(b), which shows a scenario
where the number of utilisable bits are smaller than the filter
size m. Therefore, the above construction does not leave much
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Fig. 1. (a) A scenario where all the bits in the Bloom filter are utilisable –
no unreachable bits. This is the case when 2128/k ≥ m (assuming that MD5
is used). A good example is the Bloom filter built by Fan et al [4], where
k = 4. (b) A scenario where only a part of the Bloom filter can be utilised.
This is the case when 2128/k < m (also assuming that MD5 is used). The
unreachable bits, of size m− 2128/k , are shaded.
room for the choice of k. For example, when k = 8, the
number of utilisable bits in the filter is min(m, 216), which is
too small for most applications! It is also meaningless to trade
off other parameters by increasing m in this kind of scenarios.
In Razor, each sp m signature is typically a 160-bit hashed
value calculated with SHA-1. Suppose that the following k
hash functions are used to construct the Bloom filters for
Razor,
hi(x) = (the i-th chunk of SHA-1(x)) mod m,
where i = 1, ..., k and k|160. The number of utilisable bits in
the filter can be increased, but bounded by min(m, 2160/k).
The same difficulty still exists. For example, when k = 8,
the number of utilisable bits in the filter is determined by
min(m, 220), which is not large enough for many applications.
That is, although Bloom filters as constructed in [4] empiri-
cally achieved good performance, they are not a good choice in
Razor. Such constructions cannot be easily generalised, either.
One partial solution is to divide the Bloom filter into k
chunks, and each hi hash maps x into the i-th chunk of the
filter (when necessary, a modulus of the hashed value hi(x)
by dm/ke should be taken). This can increase the utilisable
bits in the filter by a factor of k. But when m is sufficiently
large, in each chunk of the filter, dm/ke−2160/k (if SHA-1 is
used) or dm/ke − 2128/k (if MD5 is used) bits will never be
reachable. That is, in total, m− k ∗ 2160/k or m− k ∗ 2128/k
bits are still unreachable in the filter (see Fig.2). To address
this, a new hash function ~i could be introduced to map the
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Fig. 2. Each hi hash maps x into the i-th chunk of the Bloom filter. The
shaded part highlights unreachable bits in each chunk of the filter. Assume
that MD5 is used.
collection of hi(x) values into the range {0, 1, ..., dm/ke−1}.
In the future, Razor might want to use a longer hash value
representing a spam message, avoiding the above inconve-
nience all together in the first place. But for now, we can
also address this problem by constructing Bloom filters in a
different way. For example, the universal hashing [2] is a good
alternative building block, as shown in [9]; it is also applicable
in our setting.
The class of universal hash functions is of the following
form:
hc,d(x) = ((cx+ d) mod p) mod m (2)
where p is a prime, m, c, d are integers, 0 < c < p and 0 ≤
d < p. Such hash functions map a given universe U of keys
into the range {0, 1, ...,m − 1}. Construction of k such hash
functions will be discussed in Section V.
Signature revocation. Although a Bloom filter does not
support deletion, there is a simple solution to support signature
revocation in the Razor system. We can build a Bloom filter
for all spam signatures, which we call the Spam Bloom filter
(SBF), and build another for all revoked signatures, which we
call the Revocation Bloom filter (RBF). Thus, spam detection
becomes membership testing in these two Bloom filters. For
example, we can first look up the SBF, and then the RBF. The
results will be decided as follows.
1) If x is not in SBF, it is not spam;
2) If x is both in SBF and in RBF, it is not spam; if x is
in SBF but not in RBF, it is spam.
The order for membership testing can be turned around.
Which order is better (more efficient) really depends. If you
expect more legitimate messages than spam, probably you
would like to look up the SBF first.
Other concerns and results in applying the Bloom filters to
Razor are now straightforward, as discussed one by one in the
following.
Signature lookup. Lookups in SBF and RBF are both O(1).
Storage saving and false positive. With a Bloom filter,
only m bits are required to record n distinct signatures, each
of 160 bits. However, when such a collection of signatures was
not organised with a Bloom filter, its actual storage would be:
160 ∗ n+ the size of indexing hash tables.
Table I shows storage saving achieved by a Bloom filter
under different (m,n, k) configurations. To simplify the cal-
culation, the storage compression rate (CR) was estimated with
the formula CR = 160 ∗ n/m. Estimated with Equation (1),
the false positive rates in the Bloom filter are also listed in the
table.
m/n k CR False positives
16 4 10 2.394× 10−3
10 8 16 8.455× 10−3
16 8 10 5.745× 10−4
40 8 4 1.166× 10−6
40 16 4 1.948× 10−8
TABLE I
STORAGE SAVING AND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN m/n, k, f IN A BLOOM
FILTER
Signature database merging. When each Razor server uses
the same parameters (m,n, k) and the same hash functions to
build its Bloom filters, there is a simple but fast algorithm
for merging signature databases: only a Bloom filter is needed
to be transmitted from one server to another, and merging
multiple databases is simply to OR the Bloom filters bit by
bit.
Some remarks. In our above enhancement to the Razor
system, we cannot eliminate false positives in spam detection.
The Revocation Bloom Filter can also introduce false nega-
tives. But both false positives and negatives can be tuned to be
very small. On the other hand, the false positives and negatives
do occur in Razor even before any change is introduced to the
system. In our view, even if there is a small additional chance
of a false positive/negative introduced by the Bloom filters, it
will be greatly outweighed by the advantages they introduce.
IV. ENHANCING THE DCC SYSTEM WITH BLOOM FILTERS
The DCC system requires to keep track of the number
of times a message has been reported to a server, i.e. the
occurence count of the message. A Bloom filter cannot record
occurence counts, but an intuitive extension to the standard
scheme can support counting as follows. The extended Bloom
filter is an array c of m cells, each being set to zero initially.
Each cell works as a counter. When an element x is inserted or
deleted, the counts c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)] will be incremented
or decremented accordingly.
This extension was first reported in [4] by Fan et al.
However, they did not look into some useful details. For
example, it was not discussed how to tell how many times an
element x had been inserted into the filter, probably because
this was not relevant in their application. The answer is simple:
min(c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)]) tells the number of occurrences of
x witnessed by the filter, although this figure occasionally
might be just an approximation that is larger than the real
occurrence count. Another useful detail missing in [4] will be
discussed later on.
When such an intuitive extension is applied to the DCC
system, the following features can be achieved.
• Signature lookup is still done in O(1), independent of
the number of signatures.
• Signature deletion is supported by this extended Bloom
filter, but it is not essential for DCC. A DCC server only
accumulates the count of each reported message, and it
does not care whether a particular message is spam or
not. So, signature revocation is not a serious concern in
the DCC system.
Since our discussions about counting, i.e. the insertion
operation, in this Bloom filter extension can be easily ex-
tended to the deletion operation, unless otherwise stated,
we do not discuss the deletion case in the rest of this
paper.
• Signature storage. Only m ∗ sizeof(cell) bits are re-
quired to store n signatures and their occurrence counts.
The DCC end-users often use a threshold value t = 20 to
determine whether a message is spam or not. That is, a
message that has been seen for 20 times somewhere else
will be considered as spam, if it is not from someone
appearing on your white list. Therefore, 5 bits per cell
in the filter might be sufficient in the DCC. Moreover, to
provide more flexibility (e.g. some users might want to
use a threshold value larger than 20), we can allow each
cell in the filter to reach 31. If a count ever exceeds 31,
we can simply let it stay at 31.
All this indicates significant improvement over the current
solution in DCC, which has to store the following all
together:
– n signatures, occupying n ∗ sizeof(signature)
bytes;
– n occurrence counts, of n∗sizeof(count) bytes, and
– a huge hash table created for such a collection of
signatures.
In addition, counts larger than 31 can easily be supported
in each cell of the filter, which implies more storage
consumption though.
• False positives. A false positive occurs when an el-
ement x does not occur so often, but accidentally
min(c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)]) is larger than its actual number
of insertions1. The probability of such false positives,
denoted by fI , is the false positive rate (or counting
error rate) in this intuitive Bloom filter extension. We
will resort to simulations for an analysis of fI .
However, such a false positive does not necessarily lead
to a false identification of a legitimate email as spam
in DCC. A false positive in DCC occurs only when a
particular email message has its count reach or exceed
the threshold value t (i.e. c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)] all reach
t at least), though it has not occurred so often. Since
the probability that a counter is increased j times is a
1This definition considers only insertions, having ignored the case of
deletion.
binomial random variable:
P (ci = j) =
(
nk
j
)
(1/m)j(1− 1/m)nk−j (3)
The false positive rate in DCC, fdcc, can be estimated for
a given t by
fdcc ≈
(max j∑
j=t
(
nk
j
)
(1/m)j(1− 1/m)nk−j
)k
(4)
wheremax j is the maximal number of times the message
x has occurred. Intuitively, fdcc < fI .
• Signature database merging. We assume that each end-
user reports email messages she has received to no more
than one DCC server. This is a realistic assumption,
since each DCC server is usually designated to serve a
particular part of the user population. Thus, when each
DCC server uses the same parameters (m,n, k) and the
same hash functions, a simple but fast algorithm for
merging signature database can be supported: cell by cell
addition.
For the first round of database synchronisation, an ex-
tended Bloom filter is needed to be transmitted from one
server to another. However, for any subsequent round of
synchronisation, we can further reduce traffic exchanged
between DCC servers by transmitting a delta Bloom
filter only. For example, the first synchronisation between
servers a and b at time interval t0 may require each server
to transmit its own Bloom filter to the other, and then the
merging can be done as follows. For i = 0, ...,m− 1,
ct0sync[i] =
{
31 if ct0a [i] + c
t0
b [i] > 31
ct0a [i] + c
t0
b [i] otherwise
But for the next subsequent synchronisation between the
two servers at time interval t1, server a just need transmit
the following delta Bloom filter to server b:
ct1∆a [i] = c
t1
a [i]− ct0a [i], i = 0, ...,m− 1,
and server b just need transmit its own delta Bloom filter
to server a:
ct1∆b [i] = c
t1
b [i]− ct0b [i], i = 0, ...,m− 1.
Therefore, it appears that such an extended Bloom filter is
well suitable for DCC. However, the following counterexample
suggests that further refinements are needed. Assume that each
DCC server constructs its (extended) Bloom filters in exactly
the same way: the same hashes and the the same parameters
(k,m, n) Also assume that k = 3, without loss of generality.
Also assume that in server a’s Bloom filter, we have
c[h1(x)] = 2, c[h2(x)] = 5, c[h3(x)] = 8
Thus, Count(x) = 2. That is, message x has been reported to
this server at most twice. Similarly, in server b’s Bloom filter,
we have
c[h1(x)] = 4, c[h2(x)] = 4, c[h3(x)] = 3
Thus, Count(x) = 3. That is, message x has been reported to
this server at most three times. We should have Count(x) = 5
when two servers have completed synchronising their sig-
nature databases. However, the merging algorithm will give
Count(x) = min(6, 9, 11) = 6!
The lesson is that many counters in the filter, before and
after merging, could increase rapidly because of coincidental
hits, by which a single cell is used by two or more elements.
We introduce a refined extension of the Bloom filter to
address the above problem. In this extension, All else remain
as in the intuitive extension, except that the following heuristic
(which we refer to H1) will apply: when x is inserted into
c, among counts c[h1(x)], c[h2(x)], ..., c[hk(x)], only those
that equal to min(c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)]) will be increased
by one.
Return to the above scenario, and suppose that each server
witnesses one more x. Then, with the intuitive extension,
Server a has
c[h1(x)] = 3, c[h2(x)] = 6, c[h3(x)] = 9
and Count(x) = 3; Server b has:
c[h1(x)] = 5, c[h2(x)] = 5, c[h3(x)] = 4
and Count(x) = 4. However, after database merging, the
system will have:
Count(x) = min(8, 11, 13) = 8.
To the contrary, with the refined extension, we will have
c[h1(x)] = 3, c[h2(x)] = 5, c[h3(x)] = 8
and Count(x) = 3 in Server a, and
c[h1(x)] = 4, c[h2(x)] = 4, c[h3(x)] = 4
and Count(x) = 4 in Server b. After merging, we will have
Count(x) = min(7, 9, 12) = 7.
That is, the counters in the refined extension do not increase
as rapidly as in the intuitive extension, both before and after
merging!
Table II compares the counter growth in these two extended
Bloom filter schemes in Server b. It shows clearly that the
refined extension has a better performance in controlling
undesirable counter increment.
Occurence Intuitive extension Refined extension
of x c[h1(x)] c[h2(x)] c[h3(x)] c[h1(x)] c[h2(x)] c[h3(x)]
4 5 5 4 4 4 4
3 4 4 3 3 3 3
2 3 3 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0
TABLE II
COUNTER GROWTH IN TWO EXTENDED BLOOM FILTER SCHEMES: AN
EXAMPLE (AS SEEN BY SERVER b)
It is worthwhile to note that a correct implementation
of the refined Bloom filter extension implies an additional
heuristic H2: when x is inserted, if any two or more
of h1(x), h2(x), ..., hk(x) hit the same counter, then that
counter should be increased only once. If we say that
H1 is introduced to address global coincidental hits caused
by multiple elements, then the heuristic H2 addresses local
coincidental hits caused by a single element. H2 should also
be implemented in the intuitive Bloom filter extension in order
to reduce false positives – this is another insight that was
missing in [4].
We define the false positive rate in the refined extension,
fR, the same as fI is defined. fR cannot be subjected to
mathematical analysis. However, intuitively, fR < fI . In
addition to the reduced false positives, the refined Bloom
filter extension enjoys all other nice features in the intuitive
extension.
Another innovation we introduce to our Bloom filter
extension is to reduce its storage cost by splitting it to two
parts: a base filter and a number of hash tables. We rely
on a simple intuition: it is a waste of space to allocate each
counter the number of bits large enough to accommodate the
largest count that will be recorded, if the filter is expected to
maintain many small counts and the discrepancy between the
sizes of the small and large counts is large.
Instead, we introduce a base filter that has a uniform cell
size of s + 1 bits, assuming that the expected largest small
count value is not larger than 2s. An additional bit in each
cell indicates whether this count has additional bits, which,
if any, are stored somewhere else. That is, a large count has
only part of bits (e.g. its lower half) kept in the base filter. Its
other part could be stored in a hash table, indexed by the offset
of the count in the base filter. To reduce the space occupied
by this hash table, where each index requires dlog2me bits,
we virtually divide the base filter into a number of, say N ,
chunks. Then, instead of having a large hash table for the
whole filter, we organise N small hash tables, each with the
index size reduced to dlog2m/Ne, and each storing additional
bits of large counts in a chunk. Prelimilary results suggest that
this technique is promising. The detials will be reported in a
forthcoming paper.
V. A SIMULATION STUDY
It would be very interesting to evaluate how better the
refined Bloom filter extension would improve fdcc than the
intuitive one, using empirical data collected from various
DCC servers. However, such data collection has proved to be
difficult. The DCC developer did not seem to like the idea that
an additional DCC server gets connected to the whole DCC
network “for temporary, purely academic purposes” [11].
Instead, we have run a series of simulations to compare
the false positive rate that could occur in both Bloom filter
extensions, i.e. fI and fR. Additional reasons supporting such
a decision are as follows.
First of all, both extended Bloom filters are data structures
of general interest. For example, both can be applied to
applications where distributed counting2, together with fast
membership testing, is relevant. Therefore, we do not limit
our simulation design for the purpose of enhancing DCC
only, but also aim to gain a good understanding of how both
extensions (the refined extension in particular) will perform in
a general setting. To our best knowledge, no such effort has
been reported in the literature.
Second, fdcc is smaller than the false positive rate in the
Bloom filter extension that is implemented to enhance the
DCC system. That is, fdcc < fI or fdcc < fR. Therefore, fI
or fR observed in our experiments can be used as an upper
bound of fdcc.
A. Simulation design
Without loss of generality, the universal hash functions
are used to construct both extended Bloom filters in our
simulations. Following the practice in [9], we generate 2k
pseudo-random numbers, each pair being used as c and d to
define a hash in the form of Equation 2, and we also use
p = 2, 100, 000, 0113.
We use 10,000 distinct keys (i.e., elements to be inserted
to the Bloom filters) in our simulations. They are integers
randomly drawn from a universe A,A = {1, 2, ..., p − 1}.
The k hash functions are applied to each of the keys and the
corresponding cells in the Bloom filters are incremented ac-
cordingly. In the intuitive extension, cells c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)]
will all be incremented when x is inserted into the filter,
and the heuristic H2 will also be enforced. In the refined
extension, both H1 and H2 are enforced, and thus only the
cell with a value equalling to min(c[h1(x)], ..., c[hk(x)]) will
be incremented (by one only).
Our experiments are designed as follows.
Experiment 1. Each of the 10,000 elements is inserted
sequentially into the filter. This entire process is repeated 20
times. The whole insertion sequence is as follows.
x1, x2, ..., x10,000︸ ︷︷ ︸
Round1
, ......, x1, x2, ..., x10,000︸ ︷︷ ︸
Round20
Experiment 2. Each element is inserted 20 times repeatedly
into the filter. The entire process continues until all the 10,000
elements have been inserted. The whole insertion sequence is
as follows.
x1, ..., x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
20
, x2, ..., x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
20
, ... ..., x10,000, ..., x10,000︸ ︷︷ ︸
20
2Some counts returned by both extended Bloom filters might not be
accurate, due to coincidental hits. However, the number of such “approximate
counts” in the refined extension can be very small, as will shown in the later
part of this paper.
3Such k hash functions are not necessarily independent, strictly speaking.
However, we repeated Ramakrishna’s experiments and the results we obtained
were consistent with those he reported in [9]. This suggests that the universal
hash is a proven way of constructing good Bloom filters. This construction also
appears to be applicable to both extensions. Another advantage of using this
construction is its simplicity and efficiency. In our future work, we will apply
additional constraints as discussed in Knuth [5] to construct k independent,
random hashes for our Bloom filter extensions, and then repeat experiments
reported in this section to see whether any new findings will be found.
Experiment 3. Each of the 10,000 elements is inserted into
the filters 20 times, but the sequence for insertion is random.
We apply the classical Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm [6],
converting the insertion sequence in Experiment 2 into a
random sequence. Each element in the random sequence is
then inserted sequentially into the filter.
Experiment 4. Each of the 10,000 elements is inserted
into the filters in a random order, and each inserted a random
c times (c ∈ [0, 20]). For each element xi, we generate an
integer ci, uniformly distributed on the range [0, 20]. Then,
we organise all the elements in the following sequence.
x1, ..., x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
c1
, x2, ..., x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
c2
, ... ..., x10,000, ..., x10,000︸ ︷︷ ︸
c10,000
Some elements may not appear in the sequence since ci can
be zero. Let us assume there are l non-zero elements in the
sequence. We apply the Fisher-Yates algorithm to shuffle the l
elements into a random sequence, and then sequentially insert
each element into the filter.
Experiment 5. The unshuffled sequence in Experiment 4 is
inserted into the filter. That is, all the elements are sequentially
inserted into the filter, and each element inserted repeatedly
a random ci time (ci is uniformly distributed on the range
[0,20]).
Experiment 6. This experiment is the same as Experiment
4 except that ci, the number of insertions for each element, is
modelled as a Poisson random variable with parameter λ = 10.
Experiment 7. Same as Experiment 4 except that ci is
modelled as a Poisson random variable with parameter λ = 20.
Experiment 8. Same as Experiment 4 except that ci is
uniformly distributed on the range [0, 40].
In each of the above experiments, different (m,n, k) config-
urations are tested for both extensions. For each configuration,
the simulation is repeated for 1,000 different sets of hash
functions, i.e. 1,000 rounds. The mean and the standard
deviation of the false positive rate will be noted for each
configuration for both extensions.
False positives are obtained by implementing a FP counter
for each extension, which is initialised to zero at the beginning
of each round of simulation. After all the insertions are done
in a round, all distinct elements that are inserted into the
filter are identified. (That ci can be zero in some experiments
implies that some elements will not be inserted.) A list
of such distinct elements is then run through to query the
Bloom filter identifying those with an erroneous count in each
extension. Whenever such elements are found, the FP counter
will be incremented accordingly. For example, in Experiments
1-3, for an element xi, if min(c[h1(xi)], ..., c[hk(xi)]) 6=
20, then it has an erroneous count and the FP counter in-
creases by one. In Experiments 4–8, for an element xi, if
min(c[h1(xi)], ..., c[hk(xi)]) 6= ci, then it has an erroneous
count and the FP counter increases by ci.
The false positive rate is calculated by FP10,000 in each round
of Experiments 1–3, and by FPl in each round of Experiments
4–8, respectively.
B. Simulation results and observations
Tables III–X show results in each experiment, including the
false positive rate of both extended Bloom filters under dif-
ferent configurations, and reduction in false positives achieved
by the refined extension. We also compare the false positive
rates in both extensions in Figs. 3–10, which are included in
the appendix of this paper due to the space limit.
As observed from the experiments, false positive rates in
both extensions are controllable, and can be very small by
choosing proper m/n and k. However, the refined extension
has never yielded more false positives than the intuitive
extension, given the same configuration. Instead, the former
can effectively reduce the false positive rate in most circum-
stances. The only exception is in Experiment 8, where both
extensions were observed to achieve the same result when m
was increased to 640K. This is an extreme case, where m is
sufficiently large, coincidental hits will not occur and thus false
positives become zero. However, this is also the case where a
Bloom filter is degenerated into an ordinary hash table.
Since there is no benefit at all to use Bloom filters as
ordinary hash tables, it appears that we can claim that the
refined extension in practice will have less false positives
than the intuitive extension in all realistic cases, given the
same configuration. This also implies that with less storage
requirement (i.e. smaller m) or less computation (i.e., smaller
k) than demanded by the intuitive extension, the refined
extension can achieve the same false positive rate.
We also calculated the false positive rate in Experiments
4-8 by dividing the number of distinct elements having an
erroneous count with the number of distinct elements inserted
into the filter. All the above observations still apply.
Another observation is that for both extensions, when k
is fixed, the false positive rate decreases as m grows in
proportion to n. This is because there will be less coincidental
hits when the size of the filter is increased. However, the false
positive rate in both extensions (of a fixed size m) does not
necessarily decrease as k increases.
In most of our simulations, the reduction rate in false
positives achieved by the refined extension increases as k
increases, when the filter size m is fixed; the reduction rate
also increases as the filter size increases, when k is fixed.
However, both does not hold in general.
The largest reduction rates are observed when the number
of insertions for each element is uniformly distributed, and
the elements are inserted into the filter in a random order (i.e.
in Experiment 4). In the best case, the refined extension has
reduced the false positive rate by an order of about 18.
As shown in Experiments 1-5, the order in which a sequence
of elements is inserted into the Bloom filter can significantly
affect the false positive rate in the refined extension, while it
has no impact at all for the intuitive extension, which performs
the same in Experiments 1-3 as well as in Experiments 4-5. In
other words, the insertion order can have a significant impact
on the rate of false positive reduction that can be achieved by
the refined extension.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 2.390E-2 1.556E-3 2.154E-2 1.485E-3 2.548E-2 1.559E-3
160K 2.372E-3 5.013E-4 9.446E-4 2.961E-4 5.686E-4 2.375E-4
320K 1.860E-4 1.381E-4 2.570E-5 5.089E-5 4.500E-6 2.073E-5
(a)
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 5.840E-3 7.786E-4 4.167E-3 6.633E-4 4.316E-3 6.430E-4
160K 5.107E-4 2.323E-4 1.591E-4 1.250E-4 7.720E-5 8.637E-5
320K 3.450E-5 5.692E-5 3.100E-6 1.733E-5 3.000E-7 5.469E-6
(b)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 4.094 5.170 5.903
160K 4.645 5.937 7.365
320K 5.391 8.290 15.000
(c)
TABLE III
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 1: (A) FOR THE INTUITIVE
EXTENSION; (B) FOR THE REFINED EXTENSION; (C) REDUCTION RATE
ACHIEVED BY THE REFINED EXTENSION.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 5.612E-3 7.312E-4 4.069E-3 6.433E-4 4.213E-3 6.214E-4
160K 5.068E-4 2.295E-4 1.587E-4 1.243E-4 7.710E-5 8.629E-5
320K 3.450E-5 5.692E-5 3.100E-6 1.733E-5 3.000E-7 5.469E-6
(a)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 4.259 5.294 6.046
160K 4.681 5.952 7.375
320K 5.391 8.290 15.000
(b)
TABLE IV
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 2 FOR THE INTUITIVE EXTENSION
IS THE SAME AS IN EXPERIMENT 1. (A) SHOWS IMPROVED RESULT IN THE
REFINED EXTENSION, AND (B) SHOWS REDUCTION RATE ACHIEVED BY
THE REFINED EXTENSION.
The frequency that each element is inserted, i.e. the distribu-
tion of ci, can also have an impact on the rate of false positive
reduction. The comparison of reduction rates in Experiment 4
(ci: uniformly distributed over [0,20]) and Experiment 6 (ci:
Poisson with λ = 10) shows this. Experiment 8 (ci: uniformly
distributed over [0,40]) vs. Experiment 7 (ci: Poisson with
λ = 20) is another good illustration.
In all the experiments, we in fact allocate 6 bits to each cell
so that we can compare the counter growth in both extensions.
The observed counter growth in the refined extension is much
slower than in the intuitive extension for each configuration
in each experiment4. For example, there is not any cell in
the refined extension reaching the count limit 63 after all the
insertions are done, whereas there are many in the intuitive
extension. The number of cells with a count larger than 20
4Due to the space limit, tables showing the differences are omitted here.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 1.875E-2 1.392E-3 1.538E-2 1.266E-3 1.707E-2 1.292E-3
160K 1.789E-3 4.265E-4 6.278E-4 2.378E-4 3.482E-4 1.871E-4
320K 1.350E-4 1.160E-4 1.630E-5 4.080E-5 2.700E-6 1.621E-5
(a)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 1.275 1.401 1.493
160K 1.326 1.505 1.633
320K 1.378 1.577 1.667
(b)
TABLE V
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 3 FOR THE INTUITIVE EXTENSION
IS THE SAME AS IN EXPERIMENT 1. (A) SHOWS IMPROVED RESULT IN THE
REFINED EXTENSION, AND (B) SHOWS REDUCTION RATE ACHIEVED BY
THE REFINED EXTENSION.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 2.019E-2 1.734E-3 1.723E-2 1.554E-3 1.964E-2 1.608E-3
160K 1.955E-3 5.295E-4 7.178E-4 2.990E-4 4.059E-4 2.440E-4
320K 1.530E-4 1.426E-4 1.733E-5 4.976E-5 2.662E-6 1.838E-5
(a)
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 5.381E-3 7.781E-4 3.231E-3 5.685E-4 2.929E-3 5.193E-4
160K 4.491E-4 2.140E-4 1.096E-4 9.725E-5 4.738E-5 6.371E-5
320K 3.179E-5 5.712E-5 1.611E-6 1.268E-5 1.501E-7 3.049E-6
(b)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 3.753 5.331 6.706
160K 4.352 6.550 8.567
320K 4.813 10.752 17.733
(c)
TABLE VI
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 4: (A) FOR THE INTUITIVE
EXTENSION; (B) FOR THE REFINED EXTENSION; (C) REDUCTION RATE
ACHIEVED BY THE REFINED EXTENSION.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 5.982E-3 8.812E-4 3.952E-3 7.073E-4 3.810E-3 6.532E-4
160K 5.211E-4 2.511E-4 1.446E-4 1.266E-4 6.395E-5 8.661E-5
320K 3.622E-5 6.495E-5 2.853E-6 1.851E-5 2.402E-7 4.379E-6
(a)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 3.375 4.359 5.155
160K 3.751 4.964 6.348
320K 4.224 6.074 11.083
(b)
TABLE VII
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 5 FOR THE INTUITIVE EXTENSION
IS THE SAME AS IN EXPERIMENT 4. (A) SHOWS IMPROVED RESULT IN THE
REFINED EXTENSION, AND (B) SHOWS REDUCTION RATE ACHIEVED BY
THE REFINED EXTENSION.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 2.394E-2 1.643E-3 2.155E-2 1.563E-3 2.546E-2 1.635E-3
160K 2.374E-3 5.269E-4 9.459E-4 3.145E-4 5.655E-4 2.521E-4
320K 1.862E-4 1.452E-4 2.608E-5 5.405E-5 4.178E-6 2.013E-5
(a)
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 1.086E-2 1.036E-3 7.966E-3 8.512E-4 8.282E-3 8.500E-4
160K 9.937E-4 3.134E-4 2.917E-4 1.565E-4 1.536E-4 1.151E-4
320K 7.208E-5 8.158E-5 7.613E-6 2.494E-5 9.843E-7 8.584E-6
(b)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 2.203 2.706 3.075
160K 2.389 3.242 3.681
320K 2.583 3.426 4.245
(c)
TABLE VIII
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 6: (A) FOR THE INTUITIVE
EXTENSION; (B) FOR THE REFINED EXTENSION; (C) REDUCTION RATE
ACHIEVED BY THE REFINED EXTENSION.
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 2.392E-2 1.576E-3 2.155E-2 1.524E-3 2.549E-2 1.590E-3
160K 2.373E-3 5.169E-4 9.452E-4 3.002E-4 5.683E-4 2.418E-4
320K 1.866E-4 1.405E-4 2.555E-5 5.170E-5 4.735E-6 2.216E-5
(a)
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 1.365E-2 1.174E-3 1.038E-2 1.007E-3 1.109E-2 1.045E-3
160K 1.254E-3 3.553E-4 4.058E-4 1.913E-4 2.067E-4 1.361E-4
320K 9.578E-5 9.939E-5 1.007E-5 3.038E-5 1.720E-6 1.285E-5
(b)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 1.752 2.076 2.298
160K 1.892 2.329 2.749
320K 1.949 2.538 2.725
(c)
TABLE IX
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 7: (A) FOR THE INTUITIVE
EXTENSION; (B) FOR THE REFINED EXTENSION; (C) REDUCTION RATE
ACHIEVED BY THE REFINED EXTENSION.
in the intuitive extension can be more than 200 times that
in the refined one. This implies that false positives in a DCC
implementation enhanced by the refined extension can be both
smaller and less likely to occur at the same time than in a
similar system enhanced by the intuitive extension.
It is intriguing that the refined extension has performed so
differently in Experiments 1-3: it has the best performance in
Experiment 2 but the worst in Experiment 3. Although the
results appear to be counter-intuitive, they are reasonable as a
careful study reveals in the following.
Experiment 2 is effectively equivalent to Round1 in Ex-
periment 1 – the elements are inserted sequentially, and
each inserted once. Some coincidental hits do not cause
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 2.205E-2 1.740E-3 1.946E-2 1.621E-3 2.261E-2 1.741E-3
160K 2.155E-3 5.596E-4 8.327E-4 3.309E-4 4.810E-4 2.587E-4
240K 4.903E-4 2.565E-4 1.057E-4 1.217E-4 3.133E-5 6.818E-5
320K 1.704E-4 1.580E-4 2.136E-5 5.376E-5 3.146E-6 2.048E-5
640K 1.104E-5 4.113E-5 5.302E-7 8.760E-6 0.000E+0 0.000E+0
(a)
Filter k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
size m Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
80K 5.866E-3 8.001E-4 3.586E-3 5.756E-4 3.353E-3 5.255E-4
160K 5.153E-4 2.283E-4 1.207E-4 1.050E-4 5.434E-5 6.651E-5
240k 1.094E-4 1.038E-4 1.439E-5 3.496E-5 2.302E-6 1.283E-5
320K 3.975E-5 6.504E-5 3.332E-6 1.639E-5 3.635E-7 4.467E-6
640K 2.585E-6 1.483E-5 6.564E-8 1.305E-6 0.000E+0 0.000E+0
(b)
Filter Reduction Rate
size m k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
80K 3.759 5.425 6.744
160K 4.183 6.898 8.851
240K 4.481 7.342 13.610
320K 4.286 6.409 8.653
640K 4.270 8.077 -
(c)
TABLE X
FALSE POSITIVE RATE IN EXPERIMENT 8: (A) FOR THE INTUITIVE
EXTENSION; (B) FOR THE REFINED EXTENSION; (C) REDUCTION RATE
ACHIEVED BY THE REFINED EXTENSION.
false positives in Round1 but they do so in subsequent
Round2, . . . , Round20 in Experiment 1. Interesting enough,
a few more false positives turn up in Round2, but no more in
any other subsequent Round3, . . . , Round20. This is why the
refined extension has performed slightly better in Experiment
2 than in Experiment 1.
We have also examined the growth of false positives in
Experiment 3 by dividing the randomized insertion sequence
(200,000 insertions) evenly into 20 chunks. False positives
were noted once each chunk has been inserted. Since elements
in each chunk are inserted into the filter different number of
times, new false positives have been observed for each chunk.
This echoes an observation discussed earlier: the frequency
that each element is inserted matters. All this explains why
the refined extension has performed worse in Experiment 3
than in Experiment 1.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that in some simulations, the
standard deviation of the false positive rate is large compared
to its mean. Examples include all configurations with m =
320K in Experiment 1. We have examined all these cases,
and found that this is really due to the fact that a majority of
the 1,000 round simulations produced no false positives while
a minority did. (Histograms showing this fact are omitted here,
due to the space limit.) Therefore, such an occurrence of large
standard deviations is in fact a feature, not a bug!
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
First, we have shown that Bloom filters and their variants
can significantly enhance two collaborative spam detection
systems. Bloom filters have not hitherto been used for purposes
such as we have proposed.
Second, we have identified some new Bloom filter tricks,
including 1) a novel notion of “utilisable size” of the Bloom
filters, and of “global coincidental hits” and “local coincidental
hits” in the filters, and 2) a new Bloom filter variant, which
supports counting, heuristics that reduce counting errors by
addressing both global and local coincidental hits, and an
innovation that reduces its storage cost.
Third, our simulation study has shown that under the same
configuration, this new variant never performs worse, in terms
of false positives, than an intuitive Bloom filter extension that
was reported in the literature. Instead, it effectively reduces
the false positive rate in counting in all the cases, unless the
Bloom filter is degenerated into an ordinary hash table.
This simulation study also has significantly furthered our
understanding of both Bloom filter variants. For example, the
frequency that each element is inserted matters for the rate
of error reduction achieved by our new variant. The order in
which a sequence of elements is inserted can have a significant
impact on the counting error rates in our variant, but it has no
such effect at all in the intuitive variant.
Our ongoing and future work include 1) to estimate, with
empirical data, fdcc in a DCC implementation enhanced by
our new Bloom filter variant, and 2) to empirically evaluate
other performance changes that this Bloom filter variant in-
troduce to the DCC system, e.g. average speed for signature
queries. Since our Bloom filter variant can be applied to
applications where it is relevant to support fast membership
test and distributed counting with controllable inaccuracy, we
are also interested in identifying its other novel applications
in computer security.
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APPENDIX
This section compares the false positive rates in both ex-
tended Bloom filters in each experiment, using Fig. 3–Fig. 10
respectively.Experiment 1 
 
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
80K 160K 320K
Fa
ls
e 
Po
si
tiv
e 
Ra
te
Filter Size
Refined k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
Intuitive k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
80K 160K 320K
Fa
ls
e 
Po
si
tiv
e 
Ra
te
Filter Size
Refined k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
Intuitive k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 1 (log scale).
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Fig. 4. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 2 (log scale).
Experiment 3 
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1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
80k 160k 320k
Fa
ls
e 
Po
si
tiv
e 
Ra
te
Filter Size
Refined k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
Intuitive k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 3 (log scale).
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Fig. 6. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 4 (log scale).
Experiment 5 
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Experiment 6 
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Fig. 7. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 5 (log scale).
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Fig. 8. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 6 (log scale).
Experiment 7 
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Experiment 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 7 (log scale).
Experiment 7 
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
80K 160K 320K
Fa
ls
e 
P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Filter Size
Refined k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
Intuitive k = 4 k = 6 k = 8
 
 
 
Experiment 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. The false positive rates in both the intuitive and refined Bloom filter
extensions in Experiment 8 (log scale).
